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In understanding  civil wars it is useful to distinguish between their initiation and their
scale. In our previous  research we have focused on explaining their initiation, we now
address scale. The scale of a conflict has various dimensions, and here we are concerned
only with one, namely, duration. Other pertinent dimensions are the geographic reach of
conflict,  and  its  intensity  in  terns  of  mortality  and  refugees.  We consider  duration
because from a policy perspective it is arguably more important to know how to bring a
war to an end than to know how to contain it.
In Section 2 we relate the duration of conflict to two altemative models of its initiation.
Until  recently,  economic  models  of  rebellion  assumed  that  the benefits  of  rebellion
accrued only upon victory; new models treat the benefits as accruing during the conflict.
This  difference has  implications  for whether conflict  duration  will be  determined  by
substantially  similar,  or  substantially different,  factors  from those  that  determine  the
initiation of conflict. In Section 3 we present the results of hazard function regressions of
the duration of conflict based  on data for the period 1960-99. We start from the same
explanatory variables  as that of the Collier-Hoeffler model of the initiation  of conflict,
and use statistical rather than theory-based criteria to refine the model. We compare the
resulting  model  of  duration  with  the  model  of  conflict  initiation  and  draw  out
implications for the process of rebellion. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Initiation and Duration of Conflict
Until recently it was conventional to model the benefits of rebellion as being contingent
upon rebel victory. This was, for example, the assumption underpinning the celebrated
model of Grossman (1991). Although Grossman's  model was not temporal, in a simple
extension  Grossman  (1995)  introduced  a  discount  rate  into the  analysis.  Collier  and
Hoeffler (1998) assumed both that benefits accrued only upon victory, and that during the
period of fighting the rebels incurred net costs. Hence, the longer the expected duration of
war the more heavily discounted would be these benefits, and the higher would be the
2costs of fighting. The expected duration of a conflict would thus influence the decision
whether  to  rebel,  and  conversely, the  expected  eventual pay-off  from  victory  would
influence whether a long conflict was worthwhile. Duration and initiation were therefore
inter-dependent.  For  example,  suppose that  the extent  of  forest cover  determines the
probability of reaching a militarily decisive outcome but not the eventual pay-off from
victory: forests lengthen wars but do not affect post-war outcomes. Conversely, suppose
that natural resource rents determine the eventual pay-off but not the duration. Then we
would expect to find that forestation would be associated with a longer duration of war
and therefore with a reduced probability of war. Conversely, natural resource rents would
be associated both with an increased probability of war and with wars of longer duration:
high eventual pay-offs would justify long wars.
More  recently,  rebellion  has  been  modeled  as  a  'quasi-criminal'  activity  which  is
profitable during the conflict (Collier, 2000).  In this  model because the  duration of  a
conflict  is not  a  cost,  the factors which  determine  duration,  forestation  in  the  above
example,  would  not  influence  the  decision  to  initiate  conflict  and  so  would  not  be
correlated with  conflict initiation. Conversely, factors which determine the initiation  of
conflict, natural resource rents in the above example, would not be correlated with the
duration  of  conflict.  Of  course,  there  might  potentially  be  a  factor,  for  example
government capability, which influenced both initiation and duration. High government
capability  might  reduce  the  profitability  of rebellion  during  conflict,  so reducing  the
probability  of  war,  and  increase  the  prospects  of  a  decisive  military  outcome,  thus
reducing duration. However, contrary to the implication of the Grossman-type  models,
duration  and  initiation  would  not  be  inter-dependent,  arising  from  the  logic  of  the
decision calculus. They would simply have some explanatory variables in common.
In recent  empirical work we have modeled  the initiation  of civil conflict, (Collier  and
Hoeffler, 2001). The dependent variable is the probability of conflict during a five year
period, and the sample is in principle global for the period 1960-99, being reduced only
by considerations of data availability. If the rebel decision calculus balances the eventual
pay-off  against  costs  linked  to  the  expected  duration  of  the  conflict,  a  significant
3explanatory  variable  might  be  effecting  either  the  eventual  pay-off  or  the  expected
duration. If, at the other extreme, the rebel decision calculus focuses  only on viability
during conflict, then significant explanatory variables must be affecting that viability. A
comparison  of  the  empirical  correlates  of  conflict  duration  with  those  found  in  the
Collier-Hoeffler  model of  conflict initiation  can thus  to  an extent  constitute  a test of
whether  the  expected  duration  of  conflict  is  important  in  the  decision  to  initiate  a
rebellion. In turn,  this  illuminates  the  extent to which  rebellion  is determined  by the
anticipation of post-conflict benefits, relative to the benefits which accrue during conflict.
If the expected duration of conflict is important in the rebel decision calculus the factors
that are significant for the predicted probability of conflict initiation should include those
that are significant for the predicted duration of conflict. Note, however, that the signs of
the coefficients need not be the same. In the above example, natural resource rents would
be  associated  with  longer  duration  and  a  higher  risk  of  conflict  initiation,  while
forestation would be associated with longer duration but a lower risk of conflict initiation.
Conversely, if the expected duration of conflict does not enter into the rebel decision
calculus,  then  we  would  expect  to  find  little  correspondence  between  the  sets  of
significant variables in the two regressions.
The empirical correlates of the initiation  of civil war, as found in the Collier-Hoeffler
model,  can be  grouped into economic, social, geographic and historical.  Of these, the
most  important are the  economic.  The level,  growth  and  structure  of  income  are  all
significant influences on conflict risk: countries with low per capita income, slow growth,
and a high share of primary commodity exports in GDP face considerably higher risks.
Social  composition  also  affects  risk.  Countries  in  which  the  largest  ethnic  group
constitutes between 45% and 90% of the population have around double the risk of other
countries.  However,  other  than  this  'ethnic  dominance'  effect,  ethnic  and  religious
diversity  actually  reduces  conflict  risk:  diverse societies  are  safer  than  homogenous
societies. Geography matters: countries with dispersed populations, and those which  are
mountainous, face somewhat higher risks. Finally, history matters: once a country has
had  a  conflict,  it  faces  a  temporarily  higher  risk  of  further  conflict.  Several  other
explanatory  variables  have  been  tested  for  inclusion  in  the model  and  rejected:  for
4example, neither inequality nor political repression have a significant effect upon the risk
of conflict initiation. Hence, in this paper we first investigate whether the variables of the
Collier-Hoeffler model of conflict initiation provide a statistically reasonable explanation
of conflict duration.
This comparison is not the only potential contribution of the Collier-Hoeffler model to
the study of conflict duration. Our study of the initiation of conflict found that in the early
post-conflict phase  the risk  of renewed conflict is markedly higher as a result  of  the
conflict. The typical post-conflict country faces a 50% risk of renewed conflict within the
first five years of reaching peace. Of this risk, around half is due to the factors inherited
from before the conflict, the other half being attributable to some new risks which were
generated as  a result  of the conflict. These  conflict-acquired risks  gradually  decay  if
peace is maintained. In effect, our two snapshots of risk on the eve of an initial conflict
and just  after peace  has been re-established tell  us that during  the conflict something
happens which drastically but temporarily increases risk. In this paper we focus on how
the conflict  evolves year-by-year,  and  specifically how  the risk  of  continued  conflict
changes. We might expect to see the same rising risk of continued conflict during the
conflict as we find has occurred in comparing the before and after snapshots of risk.
Both  peace  and civil  war  are highly persistent  states. Societies  at peace have  a high
probability of remaining at peace. Societies in civil conflict have a high probability  of
remaining in civil conflict. In this sense the process of war duration cannot be the same as
the process of war initiation: the initiation of war usually represents an unlucky drawing
from a distribution, whereas the continuation of war is a high probability event. Thus, the
continuation  of  war  cannot  be  a  drawing  from  the  same  distribution  as  that  which
generated it, and so war must radically change the distribution. The gradual decay of the
conflict  risk  in  post-conflict  societies  tells  us  that  the  persistence  of  peace  is  itself
dynamic: the longer it lasts the more likely is it to persist. Conflict persistence potentially
has the same property, and we investigate whether this is the case.
53. Empirical Analysis
Data
The data on which the analysis is based are from Collier  and Hoeffler  (2001, 2001a).
However, while that analysis compared countries in which civil conflicts were initiated
with  those  which  remained  at peace,  the  present  analysis necessarily  only  compares
among countries in which conflicts were initiated. Here we provide a brief summary of
the data. Please refer to the appendix for a full list of the 52 war observations used in our
baseline model and a full description of the variables.
On average the civil wars in our sample are just over seven years long. The shortest wars
only lasted one month while the longest lasted over 30 years. In Table 1 we present some
descriptive statistics of the potential determinants of war duration. In the first column we
list the descriptive  statistics for the  entire  sample  and compare  these with  wars  of a
duration of four years or less (column 2) and with wars longer than four years (column
4).  We  chose  this  comparison  because  in  our  regression  model  we  include  dummy
variables  for biannual  intervals. All  variables  were  measured in  the year the  conflict
began or, if these data were not available, in the year closest to the start of the conflict.
We begin the description of the data with the economic variables. GDP per capita (in
1985 US dollars) is  around $1762  for the entire sample.  Countries with  shorter  wars
initially had a higher per  capita iticome ($2277) while countries with longer wars were
characterized  by  lower  incomes  ($1413).  This  difference between  the  different  sub-
samples  is  also  apparent  when  we  compare  the  male  enrolment  rates  in  secondary
schools.  At  the  start  of  the  conflict  in  countries  with  shorter  wars  a  much  higher
proportion of young men were enrolled (43 percent) than in countries with longer wars
(25 percent).  However, the structure of the different war economies were  similar. The
average share of primary commodity exports in GDP was about 13.5 percent for all war
observations. Countries with shorter wars are characterized by a slightly higher share of
primary commodity exports (14.5 percent).
6We now turn to some socio-political variables. Using data from the Polity III data set we
measure the level of democracy as the openness of the political institutions on a scale of 0
(least open) to  10 (most open). Both short and long wars are characterized by the same
low levels of democracy (average values of about 2.3). However, in terms of ethnic and
religious diversity we find that the averages of the sub-samples are different. We measure
diversity on a scale of zero to 100. The diversity measures are the probabilities that two
randomly  drawn individuals  do not belong to  the same group. Thus,  a value  of  zero
characterizes perfect homogeneity and  100 complete heterogeneity. The ethnic diversity
measure  is  based  on  the  data  from  Atlas  Naradov  Mira  and  the  religious  diversity
measure is based on the World Christian Encyclopedia. Countries with shorter wars are
characterized  by  much  lower  levels  of  ethnic  and  religious  diversity  (44  and  31,
respectively) than countries with longer wars (57 and 37, respectively).
In  terms  of  geographic  variables  we  also  find  that  the  countries  have  different
characteristics. Observations with shorter wars are more mountainous (28.2 percent of the
country), have a lower coverage of woods and forests (13.7 percent of the country) and
have a more dispersed population (0.52). Longer war observations are less mountainous
(22.7 percent  of the  country) but have a  higher coverage of  woods  and  forests  (30.8
percent of the country) and have a more concentrated population (0.61). Lastly, countries
with  shorter  wars  are  located  in  less  conflict-ridden  regions.  On  average  only  0.3
neighbors of the countries with shorter wars were characterized by internal warfare. For
countries with longer wars 0.4 neighbors were experiencing a conflict at the beginning of
the country's  civil war.
To  summarize,  the  descriptive  statistics  show  considerable  variation  between  the
countries with  shorter wars and the ones that experienced longer wars. We now apply
hazard functions to model the duration of civil conflict.
Constructing the Likelihood Function
The  econometric  specification  is  a  continuous  time  hazard  model  of  the  monthly
transition  rates from war to  peace. To  illustrate the specification,  consider a  country i
7which in period t experiences a war. The transition rate from war to peace is represented
by the hazard function, which we specify as
(1)  hit = exp(X/,,8 + Pj)hB(Dit),
where Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, ,B  is a coefficient vector,  Hi is a random
effect, permanent for each country, hB is the baseline hazard, and Di, is the duration of the
spell. The associated survivor function, which measures the unconditional probability that
a duration is longer than D, is equal to
(2)  Si  = expp -exp(X 1,fl+  uH)h (u)du;
and the likelihood that a period of length D is completed (&1)  or censored (&=0) at time
t  can then be written  Li, = Si, (hi,  ).  Because some countries have had several spells of
war over the sample period, we write country i's  contribution to the likelihood from R
spells equal to the product {lJ=  Li,
For  the  baseline  hazard  we  adopt  a  specification  which  allows  for  stepwise
estimation,  which is flexible. By dividing the time  axis into  W intervals by the points
C1 2,...,CCW  and assuming constant hazard rates within each interval,  we can write the
hazard function as
(3)  hi, = exp(Xtfi  + Au)exP(Ad 1 ,i,),  c,v l < Di, ￿  c,,,  w = 1,2,...,W
with  co = 0  and  cw = co, and  where  dWi,  is  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  one  if
cwl-,  <Dit ￿c,,  , and zero otherwise. This model, termed piecewise exponential, will thus
estimate W baseline hazard parameters, A,  22,...,  Aw . The fact that the baseline hazard is
allowed  to  vary  freely  between  intervals  imposes  few  restrictions  on  duration
dependence. In estimation we include an intercept in each hazard model, and therefore
exclude the first "duration dummy". Hence, negative (positive) coefficients on remaining
duration dummies means that the hazard is lower (higher) than in the first interval.
To control for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity we include a random effect  Au 1.
It is not difficult to think of unobservable factors which affect the hazard in this context,
and it is well known that omission of such factors will lead to spurious negative duration
8dependence  and  biased  parameter  estimates  for  the  explanatory  variables  (see  e.g.
Lancaster,  1990, chapter  4). To  obtain the unconditional likelihood it  is necessary to
integrate over the distribution of u. We follow Heckman and Singer (1984) and adopt a
non-parametric strategy in which the (unknown) distribution of A  g(,u), is approximated
by a discrete multinomial distribution with two points of support  u = ,  *, where
*  p,  with probability  P
I.  P2  withprobability  1-PP
Since we include an intercept we need to normalise one of the support points to zero.
Hence one support point and one probability parameter will be estimated in addition to
the other parameters of the model. The individual contribution to the likelihood function
can thus be written
(4)  LUH = P.fRILl  ( jp*  = -0. 5u2)+(1  _  p).  H= 1 L1 ( /u* =-0.5/u2)
This specification is the basis for the regression analysis to which we now turn.
Results
The hazard  function predicts  the probability'  of peace  in  each  phase  of  the conflict.
Figure  1 depicts this probability, year-by-year during the conflicts in our sample, before
we introduce any other explanatory variables. The translation from the hazard function to
a  single  summary number  for the  duration of  conflict is non-trivial  since the  hazard
function describes a  vector of probabilities. An increase in the  'hazard'  of peace  will
evidently shorten the expected duration of conflict, but the relationship is not linear. Here
we  convert  the  hazard  function  to  the  mathematical  expectation  of  the  duration  of
conflict. While the regression results directly report the hazard function, we report in the
text the effects of important variables upon the expected duration of conflict, these having
been calculated case-by-case.
We begin by using the variables of the Collier-Hoeffler model of the initiation of conflict
to  explain the duration of conflict. The only deviation from the variables  used in that
' Strictly  speaking  it is inappropriate  to use the term "probability",  as the hazard in theory is unbounded
above.  "Risk"  or "rate" are more  appropriate  terms. In practice,  with  discrete data,  the distinction  is less
important.
9model is to add dummy variables for various phases of the conflict. Specifically, we use
as  a base  the first  two  years  of the conflict and  add  dummy variables  for the  three
subsequent  two-year  periods  and  a  dumnmy  variable  for those  conflicts  which  lasted
longer than eight years. The Collier-Hoeffler model has two variants: because per capita
income  and  secondary  educational  enrolments  are  highly  correlated,  they  cannot  be
included in the same regression, but each is significant when included  separately. We
therefore test both variants.
The results  are reported  in  Table  2. The model  performs  remarkably badly  in  either
variant. The only variables which are significant are the dummy variables for the phases
of the conflict and these are obviously not part of the model of conflict initiation. This is
at least prima facie  evidence that the expected duration of conflict is not  an important
factor in rebel decisions to initiate conflict. However, such an interpretation is insecure
unless  the  best-perforrning  model  of  conflict  duration  turns  out  to  be  substantially
different.
Table 3 presents our preferred 'baseline' model of conflict duration, reached after a series
of iterations in which insignificant variables are deleted and variants of the economic,
social, geographic and historical explanatory variables are then tested in turn. We show
results without and with  controls for unobserved heterogeneity, in columns [1] and  [2]
respectively.
We first consider the economic variables. The level of per  capita income and the male
secondary school enrolment rate are each significant when included separately (recall that
they cannot  be  included  together because they  are too  highly correlated).  The results
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity imply that if the proportion of males enrolled in
secondary school is increased by 10 percentage points the 'hazard'  of peace is increased
by 42% and the expected duration of conflict is reduced by 18%.2
2 Evaluated at mean values of the regressors.
10Now consider the social variables. Ethnic fractionalization and its square are both highly
significant. Thus,  ethnic  fractionalization has  a non-monotonic  effect: the duration  of
conflict is at its maximum when ethnic fractionalization is around 50 on its 0-100 range.
This typically occurs when the society is made of a few large ethnic groups. Not only is
ethnic fractionalization highly statistically significant, the effect is very substantial. Both
a homogenous society and a completely fractionalized one have a hazard of peace which
is around eight times higher than one with a fractionalization score of 50, reducing the
duration of  conflict by 77%. There  is a  statistically insignificant but  similarly  signed
effect of religious fractionalization. Controlling for composition, the size of population is
significant: more populous countries have longer wars. The effect is fairly large: doubling
the  population  reduces the hazard  of peace  by 23%  and  so increases the duration  of
conflict by 14%.
Now consider the geographic variables. The greater the proportion of a country which is
covered in forest the lower is the hazard of peace and hence the longer is the conflict.
This  is both  statistically and  economically  significant. Comparing  a  country  with  no
forest cover with the average cover of those countries with wars lasting more than four
years,  namely  31%,  the  hazard  of  peace  is  58%  lower  and  the  duration  of  conflict
consequently  around 66% longer. The other geographic variable of significance  is if a
neighboring country has a civil war. This reduces the hazard of peace by 47% and  so
increases the duration of conflict by 41%.
Now consider the historical variables. The hazard function includes dummies both for the
decade  and  for  the  phase  of  the  conflict.  The  dummy  for  the  1990s  is  potentially
problematic  in a hazard function due to the truncation problem: for example, it is not
possible for a war which commenced in  1996 to have a duration of more than four years
given our period of observation. However, since our highest duration phase dummy is for
wars that lasted more than eight years, any war which started during or prior to the 1  980s
has had the time to last more than eight years by the end of our period of observation. To
correct for the truncation problem during the 1990s we add three interaction  terms: the
1990 decade dummy interacted with each phase of the conflict other than the first. Thus,
11the coefficient on the 1990s decade dummy itself represents only the effect of the 1990s
on the probability of peace  during the first two years of war, for which  the truncation
problem is minimal. Both the decade dummies and the phase of conflict dummies are
collectively significant. The decade dummies reveal that post-1980 the hazard of peace is
far lower than prior to 1980. A conflict starting prior to 1980 had a peace hazard around
eight  times  greater than  one  occurring post-1980  and  consequently  had  an  expected
duration only 30% as long. 3 We investigated why wars that started post 1980 appear to be
longer  by  interacting  the  post-1980  decade  dummies  with  a  variety  of  explanatory
variables, but none were significant.
The conflict phase dummies show a U-shaped pattern for the hazard of peace. There is a
relatively good chance that a conflict will end in the first two years. During the third and
fourth year the prospects for the conflict ending are at their minimum, and thereafter they
gradually  revive.  We  investigated  whether  the  characteristics  which  influence  the
duration of conflict are differentially important in different phases of conflict. For this
taking each significant variable in turn, we added interaction terms between the variable
and  the  phase  of  conflict  dummies.  Only  one  of  these produced  significant  results:
secondary school enrolment at the start of the conflict (Table 4). We found that while the
higher  is  initial  secondary  school  enrolment  the  shorter  is  the  conflict,  this  effect
gradually erodes as the conflict persists. A possible explanation for this,  consistent with
much  case  study  evidence,  is  that  during  a  long  conflict  the  educated  part  of  the
population  is the  most likely  to emigrate.  Hence, while in the early phase  of conflict
education is a force for peace, its influence gradually diminishes because the educated
leave.
We now compare the hazard function with our earlier model of the initiation of conflict.
Both have similar overall levels of explanatory power of around 30%, which might be
judged  reasonably  given the parsimony of the models, the poor quality  of the data in
3  The confidence interval is large however. Looking  a the raw data, the  average  duration for wars that
started prior to 1980, none of which were right-censored, was 78 months.  In contrast, the average duration
for wars that started in the  1980s was 105 months, hence more than  30% longer.  This number is biased
12conflict  countries,  and  the  highly idiosyncratic  nature  of the  events to  be  explained.
However, the two models are strikingly different. Only three variables are common  to
both models: neighboring wars, secondary education and population.  It is unsurprising
that a war in a neighboring country increases both the risk of conflict initiation and the
duration of a conflict should it occur. Turning to  case study evidence to illustrate what
might  be  going  on,  there  are  numerous  cases  in  which  the  same rebel  organization
operates in  more than  one  country, gaining advantages  from  the fact  that while  it  is
united,  the  opposing  governments  may  find  it hard  to  cooperate  effectively.  Current
examples are the RUF using its base in Sierra Leone to move into Guinea, the KLA using
its base in Kosovo to move into Macedonia, and the Basque separatist movement using
its safe havens in France to mount terrorist actions in Spain. However, case studies also
suggest a  different pattern  in which hostile  neighboring governments  actively support
rebel organizations in their neighbors as a form of indirect international war. An example
would be Sudanese support for the LRA in Uganda and Ugandan support for the SPLA in
Sudan. In the present analysis we cannot distinguish between these effects although both
would  give rise  to  the results  which  we  find. Obviously,  the policy  implications  are
somewhat different: the former requires active cross-border cooperation by governments,
whereas the latter requires an international peace negotiation between governments.
Recall  that  male  secondary  school  enrolment  and  per  capita  income  are  separately
significant in reducing both the risk of the initiation of war and its duration. Perhaps one
variable  proxies  the  other  or  both  proxy  some  further  correlate  of  the  level  of
development,  such as  government effectiveness.  Such an  unspecific indicator provides
little guidance  for policy other than that developed  societies will have both fewer  and
shorter wars.
We would expect the risk of the initiation of war to be correlated with population simply
because larger countries in effect aggregate the risks of more localities. This aggregation
effect  alone would produce  an elasticity of risk with respect to population  of close to
downwards,  as 20% of these wars were still  ongoing  at the end of 1999;  that is, the true average  duration is
bound  to be higher.
13unity for small levels of risk. In our analysis of the initiation of conflict the coefficient on
the logarithm of population is not significantly different from unity, so that this  is the
most straightforward interpretation of the result. The result on the duration  of conflict
may be due to a similar effect. In some countries more than one conflict is going on at the
same time.  For example,  in  Ethiopia during  the  1980s there  were  up  to  six  distinct
simultaneous civil wars. Larger countries are more likely to have multiple civil wars. In
our data, even if one conflict ends, if another conflict is continuing the country is still
classified as at civil war. Hence, for both the initiation and the duration of conflict the
population effect may be spurious.
There are eight variables  which are  significant in  initiating conflict  yet which  do not
effect  its  duration:  the  growth  of  income  prior  to  conflict,  the  share  of  primary
commodity  exports  in  GDP,  ethnic  dominance,  social  fractionalization,  the  size  of
diasporas, 4 geographic dispersion,  mountainous terrain,  and the time  which has passed
since any previous conflict. Similarly, there are three variables which are significant in
the  duration  of  conflict  but  not  in  its  initiation:  ethnic  diversity  (as  a  quadratic
relationship), forest cover, and decade dummies. These differences suggest that the likely
duration  of a  conflict is not  a substantial  factor influencing the rebels  who decide  to
initiate  it. In turn, this implies  that the initiation of rebellion is less influenced by the
prospects of attaining post-conflict goals than by its short-term viability.
Three variables that dominate the political discourse on conflict are insignificant both in
its  initiation  and  its  duration:  prior  inequality,  whether  of  income  or  of  land,  prior
political repression, and prior military expenditure. All of these variables are difficult to
measure, and there are powerful other reasons for favoring both equity and democracy.
4 We investigated  the effect of diasporas  on conflict  duration.  However,  our  data on diasporas  covers  only  a
limited number of  countries. In  our previous analysis  of the  initiation of conflict (Collier and  Hoeffler,
2001  a), the inclusion of diasporas as an explanatory variable approximately halved the sample size relative
to that used in our baseline model. Nevertheless, with a sample of over 300 observations the main variables
in the baseline model remained significant, and the diaspora variable was also significant. In the  present
analysis, because our sample is necessarily confined only to countries which have experienced  a conflict,
the reduction in sample size involved in the inclusion of the diaspora variable is much more problematic.
We are  reduced  to  only  107 observations  and  none  of  the  variables  in  our  baseline  model  remains
significant. The diaspora variable is itself insignificant, but since all the variables that are significant in the
baseline also become insignificant, nothing can be concluded from our attempt to analyze diasporas.
14However, their lack of significant effects on conflict can be contrasted both  with their
significance in other economic relationships (even when measured with the same data),
and with the fact that some other factors have such powerful effects on conflict. For our
analysis of the effects of military expenditure we drew upon our previous analysis of its
effects on the risk of conflict initiation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001a). There, to avoid the
endogeneity problem  inherent  in the analysis of the  effect of  military  expenditure on
conflict, we instrumented military expenditure using various measures of external threat.
We used these same instruments in the present analysis.
The change from those variables that are important for conflict initiation to those which
affect its duration permits a speculative interpretation of how conflicts evolve. They start
when  a  rebel  organization  is  both  militarily  and  financially  viable.  A  dispersed
population, mountainous  terrain, and prior  establishment in  a neighboring  country, all
enable the rebel organization to build up an initial military force in remote areas. In such
conditions governments are powerless to prevent the emergence of rebellion regardless of
preventative military expenditure. The presence of primary commodity exports, an enemy
neighboring government,  or a rich diaspora, all might be sources of finance for a rebel
organization, while if per capita income is low it reduces the cost of recruitment into the
organization.  Having  started because  it  is viable  the rebel  organization  will  continue
unless it becomes  unviable.  It  is unlikely  to become  financially  unviable  unless  it  is
dependent  upon  a  neighboring  government  that  settles  its  differences  with  the  host
government. Hence, the main threat to continued viability is if the rising military threat
posed by the government reaction becomes uncontainable, or if the rebels fall out among
themselves. Both forest cover and civil war in a neighbor may be important in sustaining
a conflict because they make it more difficult for an increased government military effort
to defeat a rebellion. Possibly, the greater difficulty of defeating rebellion in the  1980s
and  1990s  compared  with  the  previous  twenty  years  is  because  of  the  growth  of
international markets  for  supplies  of  armaments to  rebels.  A  financially  viable  rebel
organization can now purchase a wide range of military equipment whereas in an earlier
period access was much more dependent upon finding political favor with one or other of
the superpowers.  During  the  1990s many rebel  organizations have  become  in  effect
15entirely private enterprise activities, without political support from any major power. The
evolution in  the effects  of social composition between the initiation and  duration of a
conflict is surely striking. An ethnic fractionalization score of around 50 does not make a
country more prone  to the initiation of civil war, but if such a war occurs  it tends to
lengthen its duration very substantially. This may be because the rebel organization uses
ethnicity as a means of maintaining organizational cohesion. If so, it suggests that where
there is no potential  for ethnicity to be used as a means of rebel  identity, many  rebel
organizations  face  severe problems  of maintaining  cohesion:  hence  the  much  shorter
duration of such wars. Thus, violent conflict appears to become organized on ethnic lines,
rather than prior ethnic hatreds escalating into violent conflict.
Recall that one of the results from the analysis of the initiation of conflict is that the risk
is  temporarily  much  higher  in  post-conflict  situations.  Evidently,  something  happens
during the conflict that increases this risk. For example, one obvious hypothesis is that
since conflict causes hatred, it is the accumulated hatred that makes the reversion to war
more likely. Our analysis of how the peace hazard changes during conflict provides some
evidence  on  the  matter.  The  peace  hazard  is  the  obverse  of  the  risk  of  conflict
continuation rather than conflict initiation. However, it is reasonable to suppose that the
risk  of  conflict initiation,  which is  latent during  conflict, is monotonic  in  the risk  of
conflict  continuation.  Although  the risk  of  conflict  initiation  is  sharply  increased  by
conflict,  during  the  conflict the risk  of conflict  continuation  does  not  monotonically
increase. It is U-shaped, and is approximately the same in the sixth year of conflict as the
first. This does not seem like a plausible time path for hatred, and so it is doubtful if the
change in hatred is closely associated with the increased risk of conflict initiation. Rather,
it appears that there must be an abrupt increase in the latent risk of subsequent conflict
initiation which occurs around the onset of the initial conflict. A possible explanation for
such an abrupt change in risk is that it is brought  about by the emergence of the rebel
organization.  The  switch  from  peace  to  civil  war  is  necessarily  coincident  with  the
creation of a large, violent, non-government organization which is viable during conflict.
When the war ends it may be because this organization negotiates a deal which is even
more advantageous than the conflict, or because it becomes unviable. However, usually
16end of the conflict does not mark the end of the organization. Hence, in a typical post-
conflict  situation,  a  major  difference  with  the  pre-conflict  period  is  that  a  rebel
organization already exists. We would therefore expect conflict renewal to be more likely
than conflict initiation in otherwise identical circumstances.
4. Conclusion
We have used a comprehensive data set on large-scale violent civil  conflicts  over the
period  1960-99 to analyze the duration of conflict. We have estimated hazard functions,
correcting  for  unobserved  heterogeneity.  We  find  that  the  duration  of  conflict  is
determined  by a  substantially different  set of variables  from those  that  determine  the
initiation of conflict. Notably, the duration of a conflict is substantially increased if the
society is composed of a few large ethnic groups, if there is extensive forest cover, and if
it commenced since  1980. None of these variables has any significant influence on the
risk of conflict initiation. An implication is that the anticipated duration of conflict does
not significantly influence the decision to rebel. In turn, this suggests that the initiation of
rebellion is not closely related to the prospect of post-victory goals, as assumed in most
previous theoretical models. This is consistent with our finding that neither inequality nor
political repression prior to conflict is significantly related to either the initiation or the
duration of conflict. Instead, our results on the duration of conflict are consistent with our
previous analysis of its initiation. There we argued that the critical factors were those that
determined  whether  rebellion  was  financially  and  militarily  viable  as  a  continuing
enterprise during conflict. In this framework, since observed rebellions start out as viable
enterprises,  they  persist  unless  financial  or military  circumstances  change.  Thus,  for
example, forest cover probably makes it harder for a given government military response
to crush a rebellion. Similarly, the emergence of global unpoliced markets in armnaments
post-1980 may have advantaged rebels.
There is a notable dissonance between the focus of this analysis: the mundane material
circumstances that make rebellion viable as an enterprise, and the focus of global political
discourse  on  conflict  resolution  and  prevention:  the  supposed  ultimate  goals  and
17aspirations of rebels.  An implication of our analysis is that to shorten wars, as to prevent
them, policy needs to be refocused on reducing the viability of rebellion as an enterprise.
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21Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All Wars, n=52  Wars less than or equal  Wars longer than 48
to 48 months, n=21  months, n=31
Per capita income, 1985  1762  2277  1414
const US$  (1431)  (1767)  (1043)
Male secondary school  29.2  34.8  25.4
enrolment (%)  (23.5)  (26.0)  (21.2)
Primary commodity  0.13  0.14  0.13
exports/GDP  (0.9)  (0.12)  (0.07)
Democracy  2.3  2.3  2.3
(3.4)  (3.5)  (3.3)
Ethnic fractionalization  51.7  43.8  57.0
(29.1)  (31.5)  (26.6)
Religious  34.5  30.5  37.2
fractionalization  (25.1)  (24.6)  (25.5)
Mountainous terrain (%)  24.9  28.2  22.7
(23.7)  (25.6)  (22.4)
Forest coverage (%)  23.7  13.7  30.6
(19.3)  (11.3)  (20.7)
Geographic dispersion  0.58  0.52  0.61
of the population  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.13)
Neighbors at war  0.38  0.33  0.42
(0.49)  (0.48)  (0.50)
Prior peace duration  230.2  244.0  220.9
(months)  (142.8)  (151.2)  (138.5)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
22Table 2: The Collier-Hoeffler Model, no unobserved heterogeneity$
Coefficient  abs [z]
log Real GDP  -0.03  0.10
GDP Growth  -5.10  1.12
Primary commodity
exports/GDP  -5.87  1.07
Primary commodity
exports/GDP 2  20.39  1.69*
Social Fractionalisation  0.00  0.86
Ethnic dominance  -0.06  0.16
log Peace duration  -0.02  0.12
log Population  -0.07  0.54
Geographic dispersion of the
population  -2.00  1.49
d2  -1.40  2.21**
d3  -0.95  1.69*
d4  -0.33  0.68
d5  -0.20  0.52
Intercept  -1.04  0.38
Log likelihood  -86.62
LR x2(13)  19.97
Prob > x2  0.096
Pseudo R2 0.10
Number of observations  51
Note: z-statistics are based on asymptotic standard errors. Significance at the  10%, 5% and  1%
level is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively.
s The model with controls for unobserved heterogeneity gave identical results.
23Table 3: The Baseline Specification  for the Hazard  Function
Model  [1]: Without  controls  Model  (21:  With  controls  for
for unobserved  heterogeneity  unobserved  heterogeneity
Coefficient  abs [z]  Coefficient  abs [z]
Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalization  -0.10  3.40***  -0.08  2.42**
Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalization  2 / 100  0.10  3.16***  0.08  2.57***
Male secondary  schooling  0.03  2.28**  0.04  3.23***
Neighbours  at war  -0.79  2.21**  -0.71  1.98**
Forest  coverage  -0.02  2.32**  -0.03  2.93***
Log population  -0.05  0.33  -0.26  1.82*
Religious  fractionalization  -0.03  0.88  -0.01  0.33
Religious  fractionalization 2 / 100  0.05  0.93  0.04  0.63
1970s  -0.36  0.80  -0.05  0.11
1980s  -1.23  2.1I**  -2.26  3.86***
1990s  -2.09  1.85*  -2.51  2.23**
d2  -1.68  2.23**  -1.16  1.49
d3  -1.01  1.57  -0.13  0.19
d4  -0.18  0.57  1.72  3.00***
1990s  x d2  1.93  1.20  1.59  0.97
1990s  x d3  1.55  0.99  0.88  0.55
1990s  x d4  -0  - -0  --
Intercept  -0.69  0.35  0.53  0.25
A2  -3.12  5.12***
P  0.69
Log likelihood  -79.83  -74.92
LR x2(13)  35.52  45.34
Prob > x 2 0.00  0.00
Pseudo R 2 0.18  0.23
Number  of observations  52  52
Note: z-statistics  are based on asymptotic  standard  etrors. Significance  at the 10%,  5% and 1%
level is indicated by  , **  and ***, respectively.
24Table 4: The Baseline Specification with School Enrollment Interacted with Duration
Model  [1]: Without  controls  Model  [2]: With  controls  for
for unobserved  heterogeneity unobserved  heterogeneity
Coefficient  abs [z]  Coefficient  abs [z]
Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalization  -0.11  3.69***  -0.10  3.26***
Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalization  2  1oo  0.11  3.37***  0.10  3.51***
Male  secondary  schooling  0.05  3.57***  0.05  3.77***
Neighbours  at war  -1.01  2.72***  -1.00  2.66***
Forest  coverage  -0.02  1.74*  -0.03  2.28**
Log  population  0.07  0.48  -0.11  0.68
Religious  fractionalization  -0.04  1.05  -0.01  0.31
Religious  fractionalization 2/ 100  0.05  1.07  0.02  0.29
1970s  -0.45  0.98  -0.08  0.19
1980s  -1.35  2.28**  -2.32  4.04***
1990s  -2.61  2.24**  -2.70  2.36***
d2  -0.66  0.67  -0.39  0.40
d3  0.55  0.63  1.18  1.28
d4  1.02  1.56  2.97  3.84***
Male  secondary  schooling  x d2  0.04  1.31  -0.03  1.03
Male secondary  schooling  x d3  -0.07  2.03**  -0.06  1.76*
Male  secondary  schooling  x d4  -004  2.25**  -0.05  2.36**
y9Os  x d2  2.62  1.57  2.17  1.26
y90s  x d3  2.68  1.63  1.90  1.12
y9Os  x d4  -00  --  -J  --
Intercept  -2.87  1.25  -1.78  0.73
P2  -3.18  4.99***
P  0.73
Continues...
25Table  4: Continued
Model  [1]: Without  controls  for  Model  (2]: With  controls  for
unobserved  heterogeneity  unobserved  heterogeneity
Log likelihood  -75.39  -71.15
LR X2(13)  46.39  54.87
Prob  > x 2 0.00  0.00
Pseudo  R2 0.24  0.28
Number  of observations  52  52
Note: z-statistics  are based on asymptotic  standard  errors. Significance  at the 10%,  5% and 1%
level is indicated by *,  **  and ***, respectively.
26Appendix  Table  1: Sample  of 52 Wars
Country  Start of the  End of the
War  War
Algeria  07/62  12/62
Algeria  05/91  Ongoing
Angola  02/61  05/91
Burma/Myanmar  68  10/80
Burma/Myanmar  02/83  07/95
Burundi  04/72  12/73
Burundi  08/88  08/88
Burundi  11/91  ongoing
Chad  03/80  08/88
Columbia  04/84  ongoing
Cyprus  07/74  08/74
Dominican Rep.  04/65  09/65
El Salvador  10/79  01/92
Ethiopia  07/74  05/91
Guatemala  07/66  07/72
Guatemala  03/78  03/84
Guinea-Bissau  12162  12/74
India  08/65  08/65
India  84  94
Indonesia  06/75  09/82
Iran  03/74  03/75
Iran  09/78  12/79
Iran  06/81  05/82
Iraq  09/61  11/63
Iraq  07/74  03/75
Iraq  01/85  12/92
Jordan  09/71  09/71
Morocco  10/75  11/89
Mozambique  10/64  11/75
Mozambique  07/76  10/92
Nicaragua  10/78  07/79
Nicaragua  03/82  04/90
Nigeria  01/66  01/70
Nigeria  12/80  08/84
Pakistan  03/71  12/71
Pakistan  01/73  07/77
Peru  03/82  12/96
Philippines  09/72  12/96
Romania  12/89  12/89
Rwanda  11/63  02/64
Rwanda  10/90  07/94
Somalia  04/82  12/92
Sri Lanka  04/71  05/71
Sri Lanka  07/83  ongoing
Sudan  07/83  ongoing
Turkey  07/91  ongoing
Uganda  05/66  06/66
Uganda  10/80  04/88
Yugoslavia  04/90  01/92
Zaire/Dem. Rep. of Congo  07/60  09/65
Zaire/Dem. Rep. of Congo  09/91  12/96
Zimbabwe  12/72  12/79
27Appendix: Data Sources
War Duration
A civil war is defined as an internal conflict in which at least 1000 battle related deaths
(civilian and military) occurred per year. We use mainly the data collected by Singer and
Small (1984,  1994) and according to their definitions we updated their data set for 1992-
99.
GDP per capita
We measure income as real PPP adjusted GDP per capita. The primary  data set is the
Penn World Tables 5.6 (Summers and  Heston  1991). Since the  data is only  available
from 1960-92 we used the growth rates of real PPP adjusted GDP per  capita data from
the World Bank's World Development Indicators 1998 in order to obtain income data for
the 1990s.
Primary commodity exports/GDP
The ratio  of  primary  commodity  exports  to  GDP  proxies  the  abundance  of  natural
resources. The data on primary commodity exports as well as GDP was obtained from the
World Bank. Export and GDP data are measured in current US dollars.
Population
Population measures the total  population, the data source  is the World Bank's  World
Development Indicators  1998. Again, we measure population  a the beginning  of each
sub-period.
Social, ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization
We  proxy  social  fractionalization  in  a  combined  measure  of  ethnic  and  religious
fractionalization.  Ethnic  fractionalization  is  measured  by  the  ethno-linguistic
fractionalization index. It measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals
from a given country do not speak the same language. Data is only available for 1960. In
the economics literature this  measure was first used by Mauro (1995). Using data from
Barrett  (1982)  on  religious  affiliations  we  constructed  an  analogous  religious
fractionalization  index.  Following  Barro  (1997)  we  aggregated  the  various  religious
affiliations  into nine  categories:  Catholic,  Protestant,  Muslim,  Jew,  Hindu,  Buddhist,
Eastern  Religions  (other  than  Buddhist),  Indigenous  Religions  and  no  religious
affiliation.
The fractionalization indices range from zero to 100. A value of zero indicates that the
society  is  completely  homogenous  whereas  a  value  of  100  would  characterize  a
completely heterogeneous society.
We calculated our social fractionalization  index as the product of the  ethno-linguistic
fractionalization and the religious fractionalization index plus the ethno-linguistic or the
religious fractionalization  index, whichever is the greater.  By  adding either  index  we
avoid classifying a country as homogenous (a value of zero) if the country is ethnically
homogenous but religiously divers, or vice versa
28Ethnic dominance
Using the ethno-linguistic data from the original data source (Atlas Naradov Mira,  1964)
we calculated an indicator of ethnic dominance. This  variable takes the value of one if
one single ethno-linguistic group makes up 45 to 90 percent of the total population and
zero otherwise.
Geographic Dispersion of the Population
We constructed a dispersion index of the population on a country by country basis. Based
on  population  data  for  400km 2 cells  we  generated  a  Gini  coefficient  of  population
dispersion  for  each  country.  A  value  of  0  indicates  that  the  population  is  evenly
distributed  across the  country and  a  value  of  1 indicates that  the  total  population  is
concentrated in one area. Data is available for 1990 and 1995. For years prior to 1990 we
used  the  1990  data.  We  would  like  to  thank  Uwe  Deichman  of  the  World  Bank's
Geographic Information System Unit for generating this data. He used the following data
sources:  Center  for  International  Earth  Science  Information  Network  (CIESIN),
Columbia  University; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); and  World
Resources  Institute (WRI). 2000. Gridded Population of the World (GPW), Version 2.
Palisades,  NY:  IESIN,  Columbia  University.  Available  at
http://sedac.ciesin.org/plue/gpw.
Forest Coverage
We used the FAO measure,of the proportion of a country's  terrain which  is covered in
woods and forest. Source: http://www.fao.org/forestry
Mountainous terrain
The proportion  of  a  country's  terrain  which  is  mountainous  was  measured  by  John
Gerrard, a physical geographer specialized  in mountainous terrain.  His measure  is not
only based  on altitude but takes into account plateaus and rugged uplands. The data is
presented in Gerrard (2000).
Peace Duration
This variable measures the length of the peace period since the end of the previous civil
war. For countries which  never experienced a civil  war we measure the peace  period
since the end of World War.
Neighbors at War
This binary variable indicates whether any of the neighbours was at war at the time the
conflict began. We would like to thank James Murdoch and Todd Sandler for the use of
their  neighbourhood  data  set.  Countries  sharing  land  boundaries  are  classified  as
neighbours, island nations do not have any neighbours.
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